Abstract: This paper deals with bankruptcy situations in which in addition to the claims, an exogenously given reference point for the allocation of the estate is present. We introduce and analyse two types of compromise solutions and show that they coincide with the τ value of two corresponding TU games. We apply our solutions to a real-life case of allocating university money to degree courses.
Introduction
Bankruptcy problems were Þrst introduced by O'Neill (1982) and have been subsequently analysed in a variety of contexts. In a bankruptcy situation, one has to divide a given amount of money (the estate) among a set of agents, each of whom has a rightful claim on the estate. The total amount claimed typically exceeds the estate available, so not all the claims of the agents can be fully satisÞed.
In some situations, however, the claims of the players are not the only quantities that are relevant for determining how to divide the estate. Pulido et al. (2002) analyse the problem of dividing a sum of money to the various degree courses that are offered at Miguel Hernandez University in Elche, Spain. Each course has a claim, which reßects in some way the monetary needs of this course. These needs are determined within a Þxed set of rules and are veriÞable to everyone involved. In addition to these claims, the Valencian government (Generalitat Valenciana) provides a set of rules of its own to indicate what each course should get, without taking into account how much money is available. This allocation can be considered as an exogenous reference point for determining a fair division of the estate.
Clearly, both the claims and the references form a relevant basis for the allocation decision. The natural question is how the two sets of data in such a bankruptcy situation with references should be combined in order to reach a fair outcome. In Pulido et al. (2002) , the special case is considered, in which the estate suffices to implement the reference point. In this case, the references can be interpreted as rights. They describe a two-stage procedure which Þrst gives each claimant his reference amount and then shares the remainder using a bankruptcy rule.
In this paper, we consider situations in which the estate is not necessarily big enough to pay all reference amounts. Hence, we do not regard these references as rights. As a result, our analysis extends the analysis in Pulido et al. (2002) , but we provide different answers on the class of situations in which both models are applicable.
We consider two ways in which the claim and reference vectors are combined and for either approach, we deÞne a compromise solution. The underlying idea is the following: for each player we combine the claim and reference vectors in such a way that the resulting payoff to him is maximal. Doing this for every player, we obtain an upper vector, which can be seen as a utopia point. On the other hand, we Þnd for each player that combination which gives him a minimal outcome, which results in a lower vector. The compromise solution is then deÞned as the convex combination of the upper and lower vector that is efficient with respect to the estate.
For both approaches we also deÞne a corresponding bankruptcy game with references. These games are exact, but not necessarily convex. The compromise solutions turn out to coincide with the τ values (Tijs, 1981 ) of these games.
To illustrate our compromise rules, we apply them to the university case that was also analysed in Pulido et al. (2002) .
The paper is organised as follows. First, in section 2 we introduce bankruptcy situations with references and introduce a new monotonicity property for bankruptcy rules. In section 3 we present our compromise solutions. In section 4 we deÞne and analyse the two corresponding games and show that the compromise solutions coincide with their τ values. For the university case these solutions are presented in section 5.
Bankruptcy with references
A bankruptcy situation (O'Neill, 1982) is a triple (N, E, d) , where N is the Þnite set of agents, E ≥ 0 is the estate to be divided and d ∈ R N + is the vector of claims such that P i∈N d i ≥ E. Every bankruptcy situation (N, E, d) gives rise to a bankruptcy game (N, v) , where the value of a coalition S ⊂ N is given by
So v(S) is the part of the estate which is left for the players in S after the claims of the players in N \S have been satisÞed. Hence, in computing the value of a coalition, a pessimistic point of view is taken.
A bankruptcy rule is a function f that assigns to every bankruptcy situ- + , is such that P i∈N c i ≥ E. The claim vector c has the same interpretation as the vector d in standard bankruptcy situations, while r represents some exogenously given reference point for the division of the estate. We assume that r i ≤ c i for every player i ∈ N .
For a vector x ∈ R N and a coalition S ⊂ N , we denote by x S the restricted vector (x i ) i∈S and x(S) = P i∈S x i . Furthermore, we denote R = r(N ) and C = c(N).
Pulido et al. (2002) distinguish between two types of bankruptcy situations with references: CERO-bankruptcy situations (C ≥ E ≥ R ≥ 0) and CREO-bankruptcy situations (C ≥ R > E ≥ 0). They only analyse the CERO case, in which the estate is sufficient to give each player his reference amount. So basically, such situation can be solved by Þrst allocating this reference point and then dividing the surplus E − R. Using this idea, Pulido et al. (2002) deÞne corresponding CERO bankruptcy games.
In this paper, we consider both cases simultaneously. The analysis differs from the CERO case, because in our context the references cannot necessarily all be satisÞed and can therefore not be considered as rights. Hence, we take a different approach to solving such situations and deÞning appropriate corresponding games. Note that as a result, the analysis differs from Pulido et al. (2002) even on the class of CERO situations.
In order to come to a solution we will have to make some assumptions on the way in which the claims and reference point are used to divide the money. Obviously, the claim and reference vectors should both be taken into account, but can be done in a number of ways. We assume that Þrst a new demand vector is constructed, reßecting both r and c. After that, a given bankruptcy rule f is applied to this new vector.
Throughout our analysis, we consider two approaches to constructing the combined demand vector. For either approach we deÞne a family of compromise solutions and games, depending on the choice for f.
We assume that f satisÞes complementary monotonicity (CM):
Using an induction argument, it is easily established that this is equivalent with the same requirement only for all one-person coalitions S.
Most well-known bankruptcy rules satisfy (CM), as is shown in Pulido (2001) . One notable exception is the adjusted proportional rule. In this paper, we use two bankruptcy rules that are (CM): the proportional rule, which distributes the estate proportional to the claims, and the constrained equal award (CEA) rule, which allocates min {α, d i } to claimant i, where α is uniquely determined by efficiency.
Compromise solutions
In this section, we deÞne two (families of) compromise solutions for bankruptcy situations with references. As stated in the previous section, we assume that Þrst the reference and claim vectors are combined into a new demand vector. But instead of directly combining these two vectors, we determine for each player which combination leads to the highest payoff to him (given the rule f ) and which to his lowest payoff. This leads to an upper and lower bound for the allocation of the estate. The compromise solution is then simply deÞned as the unique efficient convex combination of these two vectors.
Geometrically, combining claims and references boils down to picking a point in the hypercube Π i∈N [r i , c i ]. We consider two possibilities. In our Þrst approach, the extreme approach, we consider the extreme points of this hypercube, ie, points in which some players demand their reference amount and the others their claim. The lower vector l f and the upper vector L f are deÞned by
for all i ∈ N . It follows from CM that (r i , c N\{i} ) is the worst extreme point for player i and that (c i , r N\{i} ) is the best. If in a point the estate suffices to satisfy all demands, then player i gets what is left by the other players, with a maximum of his own claim c i . In the following lemma, which we will prove in section 4, we show that l f and L f can indeed be considered as lower and upper bounds, respectively, for the division of the estate.
Lemma 1 Let (N, E, r, c) be a bankruptcy situation with references. Then for the corresponding lower and upper vectors we have l f ≤ L f and
The extreme compromise solution γ f is deÞned by
As a result of the previous lemma, such α exists.
In our second approach, the diagonal approach, we consider the main diagonal of the hypercube. The lower and upper vectorsl f andL f are deÞned by
where for all i ∈ N,
Also in the diagonal case, the vectorsl andL can be considered as lower and upper bounds, as was shown for the extreme approach in Lemma 1. The diagonal compromise solutionγ f is deÞned bȳ
Bankruptcy games with references
In this section, we deÞne for either approach a corresponding cooperative game. In line with Pulido et al. (2002), we take a pessimistic point of view, so the deÞnitions of the characteristic functions resemble the ones for the lower vectors in the previous section. Throughout the analysis, we assume that f is a CM bankruptcy rule. We deÞne the extreme game (N, v f ) by
Note that if r(S) + c(N \S) < E, the ensuing problem is not a bankruptcy situation and the players in S can obtain what is left by the players in N\S.
As a result of CM, it immediately follows that (r S , c N\S ) is the worst point for S in the hypercube, thus v f (S) actually represents the most pessimistic situation for coalition S under the extreme approach. Although it is intuitively clear that this should be the worst point for S, we need CM to ensure that it is actually so 4 .
The diagonal game is deÞned byv
In the second part of the deÞnition the agents receive what is prescribed by the weighted vector and the remainderĒ λ is distributed according to the rule f, using the residual claimsd λ . Note that if (N, E, r, c) is a CREObankruptcy situation, then in the deÞnitions of both v f andv f only the Þrst case arises.
As a result of CM, it is easy to check that the game v f is more pessimistic thanv
for all S, T ⊂ N. The core of a game (N, v) is deÞned by
A game (N, v) is exact (Driessen and Tijs, 1985) if for all S ⊂ N there exists an x ∈ C(v) such that x(S) = v(S). Exactness is a weaker property than convexity. The extreme and diagonal games corresponding to a bankruptcy situation with references turn out to be exact, as is stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Let (N, E, r, c) be a bankruptcy situation with references. Then the two corresponding games v f andv f are exact.
Proof. First, we prove exactness of v f . Let S ⊂ N and distinguish between two cases:
It is easy to check that, because f is CM, x ∈ C(v f ).
If r(S) + c(N/S) < E, then v
Example 1 Consider the bankruptcy situation with references (N, E, r, c), where N = {1, 2, 3, 4}, E = 12, r = (1, 2, 4, 7) and c = (3, 3, 5, 10) . Taking the CEA rule, we obtain
Then,
Therefore, v CEA and v CEA are not convex.
Using exactness of v f , we can now prove Lemma 1.
Proof of Lemma 1. From complementary monotonicity of f, l f ≤ L f readily follows. For the second statement, Þrst observe that l (N, E, c) . Combining these two cases, we have
The τ value (Tijs, 1981) of a quasi-balanced game (N, v) is deÞned by
The class of quasi-balanced games contains the class of exact games, so as a result of Proposition 2, the τ value is deÞned for both bankruptcy games with references.
The extreme compromise solution coincides with the τ value of the game v f , as is stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 3 Let (N, E, r, c) be a bankruptcy situation with references and let f be a complementary monotonic bankruptcy rule. Then
Proof. Driessen and Tijs (1985) proved that for each exact game (N, v),
For the upper vector, we have
Similarly, one can prove the analogous result for the diagonal compromise solution.
Theorem 4 Let (N, E, r, c) be a bankruptcy situation with references and let f be a complementary monotonic bankruptcy rule. Thenγ f = τ (v f ).
Case
In this section we consider the case of dividing university money as described in Pulido et al (2002) . The problem is as follows: in the academic year 2000-2001, the Universidad Miguel Hernández in Elche, Spain, had 717, 239.11 euros to divide among the 27 different degree courses to buy equipment for teaching laboratories. The board of the university decided to create a committee to study how to allocate the money. This committee asked each teaching unit what their real needs were and added these demands for each degree course. Therefore, these demands represent the claims of each administrative entity (degree course representative) and they were based on reports on the requirements for the next academic period.
Since these demands could be biased (due to way in which they were obtained) and could include a high level of subjectivity, the committee looked for a more objective measure for reference. In this case, these reference amounts were obtained by applying objective criteria and laws provided by the Generalitat Valenciana to support the public university system. These criteria take into account, for each degree course, concepts like the number of students, the number of academic years that the course exists, and so on.
The table below shows the vectors of references and claims, together with the outcomes (in euros) using the compromise solutions. Note that the estate is greater than the total amount of the references, (404, 816.17), and less than the total of claims, (4, 078, 097.61), so this is a CERO situation. Pulido The last four columns represent the compromise solutions provided by the CEA and the proportional rule (which are very easy to implement) under the extreme (γ f ) and the diagonal (γ f ) approaches. Note that the references have not to be respected. For example, using the proportional rule, under both approaches the third agent receives less than his reference amount. As indicated earlier, this is not the situation for the CERO approach described in Pulido et al (2002) , where each agent receives at least his reference.
